自愿性业绩承诺风险、独立财务顾问声誉与收购方股权结构

Voluntary Performance Commitment Risk,Independent Financial Adviser Reputation and Acquirers’ Equity Structure

以沪深两市A股上市公司的重大资产重组事件为样本,考察了收购方聘用的独立财务顾问的声誉对目标资产自愿性业绩承诺风险的过滤能力,并从股权集中度和股权制衡度两个方面进一步分析了收购方股权结构对独立财务顾问声誉与自愿性业绩承诺风险之间关系的影响。研究发现:独立财务顾问的声誉越高,其抑制自愿性业绩承诺风险的能力就越强;股权集中度越低,独立财务顾问声誉与自愿性业绩承诺风险之间的负相关关系就越显著;无论股权制衡度是高还是低,独立财务顾问过滤自愿性业绩承诺风险的效果都没有显著差异。

Taking the major asset restructuring events of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as samples,this paper examined independent financial adviser’s filtering capability for voluntary performance commitment risk of target assets,and explored the role of acquirers’equity structure in this relation from perspectives of ownership concentration and ownership balance.This study finds that the better the reputation of financial advisers is,the stronger their filtering capability is.And the lower ownership concentration degree is,the more significant the negative correlation between independent financial advisers’reputation and voluntary performance commitment risk is.Moreover,the filtering effect of independent financial advisers has no differences under different degrees of ownership balance.