司法豁免与议会暴力:基于法经济学的视角

Judicial Immunity and Parliamentary Violence:from the Perspective of Law and Economics

本世纪以来,世界范围内一些国家和地区中的议会暴力事件频繁发生。基于法经济学的视角,可以得出一个理论解释:由于大多数国家的宪法在议会独立性和议员司法豁免方面的相关规定,暴力策略成为议员们解决各种冲突时的一种低成本的合法选择。在实证分析中,根据2000～2017年27个国家(地区)的议会暴力数据和负二项回归分析结果,"司法豁免权会导致议会暴力更容易发生"这一假说得到了经验事实的支持。制度的主要功能之一是降低不确定性世界中的交易成本。因此,"司法豁免权"假说的一般化含义是,有效率的制度如果以豁免的形式被取消,会导致整个国家(地区)的交易成本上升,其解决途径在于取消豁免制度,或者是采用一项新的制度来弥补豁免所导致的制度缺失。

Since the beginning of this century,parliamentary violence has frequently occurred in some countries and regions around the world.From the perspective of law and economics,this paper provides a theoretical explanation to this phenomenon:as the constitutions of most countries contain provisions on parliamentary independence and judicial immunity of parliamentarians,violent strategies have become a low-cost legal choice for parliamentarians to resolve conflicts.The parliamentary violence data from 2000 to 2017 of 27 countries(regions)and the negative binomial regression analysis support the hypothesis that'judicial immunity leads to more parliamentary violence'.One of the major functions of the institution is to reduce the transaction cost in the uncertain world.Therefore,the general implication of the'judicial immunity hypothesis'is that if an efficient institution is cancelled in the form of immunity,the transaction cost of the entire country(region)will increase.The solution is either to eliminate the immunity institution or to adopt a new institution to make up for the institutional deficiency caused by immunity.