摘要
中国农民负担可以理解为一个政治过程。通过对国家、基层组织、农户等经济主体各自的利益取向、权利结构以及相互力量之间的对比分析,我们可以发现,责任与利益激励使得基层组织有着增加农民负担的冲动,机会主义心态和反对成本高昂等原因又使得农民无法有效抵制负担。利用博弈模型可以检验和演示农民负担增加的制度性根源。体制变革是减轻农民负担的治本之策。
In this article, Chinese peasants' burden is considered as a political course,through analysis of interests, rights, and powers of state, primary state organizations and farmers, the writer considers that the primary state organizations have impulse to burden the peasants because of encouragements of responsibilities and benefits. But Chinese peasants cannot resist this burden because of opportunism orientation and oppositions of expensive costs. By use of mode of game theory, the writer will check and demonstrate the origin of his conclusion. At last, the writer argues that the efficient tactics to reduce the burden of Chinese peasants is dispensation reform.
出处
《吉林大学社会科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第4期30-35,共6页
Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition
基金
教育部"十五"规划项目(01J790139)
关键词
农民负担
基层组织
农户
理性选择
peasants' burden
primary state organization
farmer
rational choice