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收入生产、交易费用与宪政体制 被引量:16

Revenue Production, Transaction Costs and Constitutional Regime
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摘要 本文运用交易费用政治学、政治史和财政史上的理论和经验研究成果研究了宪政体制的发育和维持。本文的主要观点是,国家在收入生产过程中所面对的各种交易费用约束将影响到国家的政治选择,进而将影响到宪政体制的发育和维持。 This essay applies transaction cost politics, political history, and fiscal history to examine the development and sustenance of a constitutional regime. The central argument is that various transaction costs occurring in the revenue production of the state will affect the state' s political choices, hence the development and sustenance of constitutional regime.
作者 马骏
出处 《开放时代》 2003年第4期84-94,共11页 Open Times
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参考文献36

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  • 2J. D. White (1999), Taking Language Seriously,Gorgetown: Gorgetown University, p. 6.
  • 3马骏.交易费用政治学:现状与前景[J].经济研究,2003,38(1):80-86. 被引量:61
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二级参考文献11

  • 1Aldrich, John. 1997, When is it rational to vote? In Dennis Muller. 1997. Eds. Perspectives on Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 373-390.
  • 2Bartle, John & Jun Ma. 2001, Applying Transaction Cost Theory to Public Budgeting and Finance, In John Battle. Eds. 2001. Evolving Theoties of Public Budgeting. New York: JAI Press.
  • 3Blais, Andre and Dion, Stephane. Eds. 1991, The Budget-maximizing Bureaucrat: Appraisals and evidence. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsbush Press.
  • 4Buchanan, James & Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
  • 5Dixit, A, 1996, The Making of Economic Policy. Cambridge, The MIT Press.
  • 6Downs, A, 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
  • 7Epstein, D. & S. O'Halloran, 1999, Delegating Powers. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • 8Frant, Howard, 1996, High-powered and Low-powered Incentives in the Public Sector, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Vol. 6, No. 3 (July): 365-81.
  • 9Green, D. & L. Shapiro, 1994, The Pathologies of Rational Choice. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • 10Horn, Murray J, 1995, The Political Economy of Public Administration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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二级引证文献55

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