“公地悲剧”及其治理的博弈分析

The Game Analysis of“The Tragedy of The Commons”and It's Treatment

传统经济学得出的“公地悲剧”的结论是片面的。需要从博弈论的角度 ,充分考虑农户间行为的相互约束和牵制。一定的条件下 ,农户们自觉限制羊的饲养量 ,是一个内生的博弈规则 ,它能够自实施 ,成为人们的共同信念 ,“公地悲剧”必然不再产生。

The traditional economics has drawn the conclusion of “the tragedy of the commons,” but it is unilateral.The paper argues that we should think over the mutual restrict and diversionary mechanism among the farmers behavior from the game theory.Uner some conditions, it is an endogenous game rule that the farmers would limit the amount of the feedings of the sheep of their own accord. This rule can be actualized automatically and becomes the common faith. Therefore, “the tragedy of the commons” is not inevitable.