经济建设中地方保护问题及其解决的博弈思考

The Game Analysis on the Question and its Resolution to the Local Economic Policy of Protection

借助于两阶段博弈模型分析得出经济建设中的地方保护行为是低效率的,但却是很难避免的;得出了只有在中央政府的宏观调控下,运用恰当的经济政策,才可能会使地方政府放弃地方保护政策,并使得经济运行达到最优条件.

On the basis of game analysis, the inefficient local economic policy of protection is inevitable without the control of central govemment. Under the macroeconomic regulation of the central govemment and proper economic policy being applied, the local economic policy of protection may be avoided and its economy can function better.