信息产品在非线性效用函数下的二度价格歧视研究

A Study of Second-Degree Price Discrimination of Information Goods with the Nonlinear Utility Function

本文中假定消费者的效用函数为非线性的效用函数,垄断厂商提供同一种信息产品的两种质量版本,消费者根据两类约束做出自己的消费选择。厂商通过消费者的两个无差异点来对消费者进行二度价格歧视,通过分析我们得出厂商的歧视条件。

This paper assumes consumers' utility function is nonlinear function.The monopolist offers two quality lever of the same information goods,and consumers decide which lever to choose. The firm practices seconddegree price discrimination according to two indifference points so that we can find out its discrimination condition by analyzing it.