摘要
本文以 1999— 2 0 0 2年间实施了MBO(管理层收购 )的上市公司作为研究对象 ,在大量数据资料基础上 ,对这些公司的业务、财务、股本、管理、行为等特征以及收购定价、资金来源等问题进行了多方面的实证检验。通过研究 ,我们认为 ,MBO并不是“国退民进”的重要途径 ,成功实施MBO的企业需要一系列重要的条件 ;MBO实施过程中出现的争论实质上是公众和政府对国有存量资产改革中“分配的公正性”问题的理解与管理层对该问题的理解存在差异 ;EMBO(管理层收购和员工持股 )可以作为从企业层面解决国有企业产权改革公正性和合法性的一种制度性安排。
Taking the listed companies which carried out MBO from year 1999 to 2002 as research objectives, based on large quantities of data, this paper has done empirical examinations on many aspects of objective companies, such as business, finance, capital, management, behavioral characteristics, buyout pricing and capital origin. After that, the positive characteristics during MBO of listed companies have been further analyzed and explained by use of economic theories. Finally we conclude that, MBO is not the main choice of implementing the 'state capital out and private capital in' strategy, some important conditions are still necessary for companies to implement MBO successfully; the essence of disputes involving MBO reflects different understanding of publicity and government and management on the 'justification of distribution' of the reform of state-owned stock assets; EMBO (Employee & Management Buyouts) could be a system arrangement of solving the justification and legalization puzzle of property right reform of state-owned companies from the level of enterprise.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第10期74-81,共8页
China Industrial Economics