动态最优税率设计问题:一个Stackelberg微分对策模型

Problem of dynamic optimal tax rate design:Stackelberg differential game model

利用微分对策理论,定量地探讨动态最优税率的设计问题.首先在一定的假设条件下建立描述动态最优税率设计的Stackelberg微分对策模型,政府在此模型中充当对策的"主者(leader)",企业充当对策的"从者(fol lower)".然后利用极大值原理及倒向微分方程,分析当政府考虑到企业潜在的理性反应时,如何制定出最优的税率,使税收在考察时期里最大化.最后给出不同均衡解的经济含义以及模型可能的扩展.

Differential game theory is used to study the quantitative properties for the problem of dynamic optimal tax rate design. First, under some proper assumptions , a simplified Stackelberg differential game model is created. Government acts as the leader and firm acts as the follower in this special hierarchical game. Then, by Pontryagin's maximum principle and backward differential equations, we analyze that how the government selects an optimal tax rate so as to maximize his tax revenues during a given time horizon while he takes into account the potential interdependent reaction of the firm. Finally, the main economic implication of the different equilibrium solutions is given and the possible development of the model is briefly discussed. 