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我国经济体制改革中公司治理的委托代理问题 被引量:1

The Problem of Trust-agency in Company Administration During Economic System Reform in Our Country
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摘要 通过简要分析委托代理问题产生的原因 ,针对我国国有企业中委托代理关系中存在的问题 ,重点探讨了解决我国国有企业中委托代理问题的对策 :认为在平等与效率兼顾下引入独立董事制度 ,同时构建约束产权代表与代理行为的双向制衡机制 ,建立完善有效的激励机制是解决我国国有企业中委托代理矛盾的几项重要措施。 To solve the optimization problem of enterprise structure during economic system reform, the relationship between trust and agency is an important aspect. This paper briefly analyzed the generating reasons of trust-agency relationship problem. At the same time, it summarized the problems existed in the relationship of trust-agency in state-owned enterprises. The authors focus the discussion on solving the problems of trust-agency relationship. It is considered that enterprises should introduce independent director system while giving attention both equality and efficiency, construct bilateral restrictive balance system to restrict the actions of representatives and agents of the property, establish valid encouragement system. These are important measures to solve the trust-agency relationship problem in state-owned enterprises.
出处 《石家庄经济学院学报》 2003年第3期240-243,共4页 Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics
关键词 经济体制改革 公司治理 委托代理 激励机制 独立董事 中国 trust-agency relationship bilateral restrictive balance system encouragement system independent director
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