摘要
节能减排是我国的国家战略,节能服务市场的蓬勃发展必将会对节能减排战略产生深远的影响。在政府节能减排政策的有力支持下,建筑节能市场规模空前扩大,建筑节能服务市场也应借此契机大力发展,这将改善我国建筑高耗能的现状。而政府出台政策如若忽视政策改变对市场和市场参与者行为的影响,将会导致政策效果偏离预期、市场反馈失真等情况发生。该文运用福利分析方法和进化博弈,建立政策改变对建筑节能服务市场及企业和用户市场行为的影响模型,探讨其行为的演化稳定策略与政府激励机制、监督机制及政策动态化调整机制之间的关系。通过模型分析可以得出长期性与短期性的动态政策相结合是政府培育建筑节能服务市场的有效行为。
The development of the energy services market will inevitably influence the national energy efficiency strategy in China. The market has expanded quickly under the strong support of the government. The building energy efficiency service market should also take this chance to develop vigorously to further improve the high energy consumption status of buildings in China. If the government ignores the impact of the policy change and the behavior of participants on the market,deviations from the expected effects and feedback distortion of the market will be lead. Welfare analysis methods and evolutionary game theory is used to establish the model of the impact of the dynamic policies on building energy efficiency services market and the behavior of enterprises and users,and to explore the relationship between stable strategy market behavior of the enterprises and users and the relationship between incentives mechanism,oversight mechanism and policies dynamic adjustment mechanism. The analysis results show that the combined short and long policies are the effective for government to cultivate energy efficiency market.
出处
《土木工程学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2014年第7期136-144,共9页
China Civil Engineering Journal
关键词
建筑节能服务市场
市场培育
动态培育政策
政府政策影响
building energy efficiency service market
market cultivation
dynamic cultivation policy
influence of government policy