摘要
通过构建经理期界行为模型,对企业经理寻租行为的内在机理进行解释,指出任职期界与选择寻租活动的可能性成正向变动的关系,即在相同条件下,年龄较大的企业经理将更有选择寻租行为的动机。得到经理寻租活动发生的可能性与寻租行为被发现的概率、激励比例和努力成本的相互影响关系。最后分析了社会制衡机制和内部处罚对经理行为的制约作用。
By constructing a tenure model of manager, this paper explains the inner mechanism of manager's rentseeking action, and indicates that the relationship between manager's tenure and rentseeking action. That is, under the same conditions, the older manager has more incentive to select rentseeking action. The probability of rentseeking action lies on the probability of being detected of rentseeking action, the proportion of incentive, and the cost of endeavor. Finally, we analyze the restricted mechanism of society and inner punishment.
出处
《重庆大学学报(自然科学版)》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第10期136-139,共4页
Journal of Chongqing University
关键词
企业经理
寻租行为
信息不对称
期界模型
manager
rent-seeking action
asymmertric information
tenure model