如何保障“保障房”——搜索匹配模型框架下的住房市场分类均衡和政策分析

Supply of Public Housing: A Search and Matching Model with Sorting Equilibrium in Housing Markets

日趋高涨的房价使"住房难"成为中国当下一个重大的民生问题。为了解决中低收入家庭住房难的问题,国家大力推行保障房政策。然而在保障房政策实施的过程中,很多高收入家庭通过瞒报自己的资产状况和收入水平"骗购"保障房。本文通过建立一个住房市场的搜索匹配模型来分析"骗购"背后的机制,并通过分析分类均衡(即高收入家户自发选择进入高档房屋市场而不进入保障房市场)实现的条件,给出政策建议。我们认为,降低保障房的广义上的"质量"(包括装修程度、交通便捷程度以及相应的配套设施的完善程度)或者拉大保障房质量与中高档房屋质量的差距,有利于分类均衡的实现,即有利于防止高收入阶层进入保障房市场从而保障"保障房"供给真正需要的人。

In China, governments supply low-income households with public housing. However, many high-income households hide their actual income to be eligible for the public housing. We build a search and matching model in housing markets and explore the conditions for the existence of a sorting equilibrium to explain the mechanism underlying this phenomenon. We suggest that lowering the quality of public housing(e.g., project location) or enlarging the quality gap between commercial housing and public housing prevents high-income households from cheating.