中期排名、晋升激励与当期绩效:关于官员动态锦标赛的一项实证研究

Interim Rank,Promotion Incentives and Current Performance:Evidence from the Dynamic Tournament among Chinese Local Officials

本文在一个动态锦标赛的背景下,考察了地市GDP增长绩效的中期(上一年)排名对其当年GDP增长率的影响。我们发现,中期排名越高,当期绩效越好。我们区分前任官员和现任官员之后,发现前任官员的中期排名越靠前,现任官员的当期绩效越好,而如果是现任官员的中期排名靠前,当期增长绩效则会相对差一些,但中期排名的总体激励效应为正。本文从相对绩效评估和官员的晋升激励的角度解释了这些发现,并利用官员的临界年龄前后导致的不同激励效应给出了进一步的证据。我们排除了一些其他可能的解释,如不同省地市竞争程度的差异、官员的交流和选拔、能力的异质性以及省内地市经济增长的不平衡。我们还分析了中期排名对于当期绩效的影响渠道。

In a dynamic tournament setting,this paper investigates the effect of a city's interim rank of GDP growth in a province on this city's contemporaneous GDP growth.We find that the higher a city's interim rank,the higher its current GDP growth.After distinguishing the interim rank of the immediate predecessor from that of the incumbent city leader,we find that while the effect of the immediate predecessor's interim rank is strongly positive,the effect of current incumbent's rank somehow weakens the influence of interim rank on contemporaneous GDP growth,although its overall effect remains positive.We explain these phenomena from the perspective of relative performance evaluation and officials' promotion incentives under a dynamic tournament,and provide further evidence for this perspective by identifying changes in the effect of interim rank before and after a city leader approaches a critical age.Several alternative interpretations are ruled out.We also analyze the economic consequences of interim rank.