为什么最好雇个乐观者?——模糊性下的最优合同

Who to Hire,Optimists or Pessimists?——Optimal Contract Under Ambiguity

人们在决策时如果无法获知相关事件的发生概率,便称为人们面临模糊性(ambiguity)决策。此时Savage的主观期望效用模型将不再适用于刻画决策者的行为,前沿的决策理论通过引入模糊性感知和模糊性态度对该模型进行了修正。基于此,本文利用基于NAC(neo-additive capacity)的容度效用模型研究了模糊性下雇佣关系中的最优合同问题,发现:(1)由于决策方式的不同,乐观的雇员更容易被激励,因而他们往往能够给雇佣者带来更大的利润;(2)模糊性是合约设计中十分重要的考虑因素,忽略了不确定性,任何理论上的最优合约都可能失效。本文也解释了为什么企业文化中经常提倡积极态度(如乐观主义),以及为什么大量创业公司在初期盈利较好,发展壮大后反而衰落等现象,因而对理解企业的行为、发展以及合同设计提供了新的视角和理论框架。

Under ambiguity,where the probabilities of events are unknown,Savage's model is not applicable for describing a decision maker's behavior.Since no valid distribution can be obtained,ambiguity perception and ambiguity attitude are introduced to account for the decision maker's choice.In this paper,we used the Choquet Expected Utility(CEU)model with neo-additive capacity to study the optimal contract in an employment relationship. We found that:(a)optimistic employees could bring more profit to the employer because they are more easily motivated;and(b)any optimal contract may fail if ambiguity factors are neglected.Based on these findings,we explain the reason of positive attitudes such as optimism are often praised in corporate cultures and provide a potential reason for why some start-ups have satisfying earnings in the beginning but then fail as they grow larger.