期刊文献+

消费者预期对电商平台信誉机制有效性的影响 被引量:1

The Influence of Consumer's Expectation on the Efficiency of the Electronic Commerce Platform's Credit System
下载PDF
导出
摘要 本文从预期的角度审视电商平台上以好评率为核心而构建的信誉机制。当买家(消费者)的预期与商品的实际情况不符时,差评产生。如果这种不符是由于卖家对商品进行了欺诈描述造成的,信誉机制便是有效的;而如果这种不符是由于缺乏经验的买家无法根据卖家合理的描述来形成正确的预期而产生的,信誉机制便有可能会失效。本文构建了固定样本量搜索模型,得出了不同类型的买家购买不同价格不同质量商品的概率,在假定买家在判断商品的质量时有可能会产生错误预期的情况下,得到了卖家获得的差评率,从而给出了信誉机制失效的条件。最后,本文对模型中的结论进行了数值模拟,通过对其中的效用函数赋予特定的形式和数值,说明信誉机制失效是可能出现的。本文启发性地应用经济模型分析,表明了买家是否能形成正确的预期可能是影响信誉机制有效性的根本原因之一,从而为今后信誉机制的设计与改进提供了理论指导。 This paper examines the good-score based credit system in the view of expectation.Unsatisfactory-score is made when the actual situation of the commodity is inconsistent with the expectation of the consumer.If such inconsistence was due to the fraudulency of the seller,the credit system works well.However if such inconsistence was resulted from the inexperienced consumer who cannot form appropriate expectation based on the product description of the seller,the credit system might lose effect.This paper constructs a fixed sample search model,through which the probabilities of different types of commodities get purchased are obtained.Assuming consumers might make mistakes on estimating the quality of the commodity,the probability of the seller getting bad scores is estimated,through which the conditions that when the credit system might lose effect are determined.Finally,this paper also conducts numerical simulations by giving the utility function a particular form and values,we then find out that the credit system may actually lose effect.This paper demonstrated analytically that whether the consumer can form appropriate expectation is one of the key factors to the efficiency of the credit system,which provides theoretical guidance to the design and progress of the credit system in the future.
作者 何为 李明志
出处 《经济学报》 2015年第4期110-129,共20页 China Journal of Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"双边市场中的信息甄别与信用评价机制"(71273151)的资助
  • 相关文献

参考文献15

  • 1Lutz N A.Warranties as signals under consumer moral hazard. The Rand Journal of Economics . 1990
  • 2Kahneman,D.Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics. The American Economist . 2003
  • 3De los Santos Babur,Horta?su Ali,Wildenbeest R. Matthijs.Testing Models of Consumer Search Using Data on Web Browsing and Purchasing Behavior. The American Economist . 2012
  • 4Akerlof,G. A.The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics . 1970
  • 5GEORGEJ STIGLER.TheEconomicsofInformation. TheJournalofPoliticalEconomy . 1961
  • 6Armstrong M,Vickers J,Zhou J.Consumer protection and the incentive to become informed. Journal of the European Economic Association . 2009
  • 7List J A.Preference reversals of a different kind:The'moreis less'phenomenon. The American Economist . 2002
  • 8ark Armstrong,Yongmin Chen.Inattentive consumers and product quality. Journal of the European Economic Association . 2009
  • 9何为,李明志.电子商务平台上的信息不对称、交易成本与企业机制的运用[J].技术经济,2014,33(6):26-31. 被引量:14
  • 10吴德胜,李维安.声誉、搜寻成本与网上交易市场均衡[J].经济学(季刊),2008,7(3):1437-1458. 被引量:41

二级参考文献52

  • 1周涛,鲁耀斌,张金隆.网上市场与传统市场价格对比的实证分析[J].管理评论,2006,18(11):26-30. 被引量:10
  • 2周黎安,张维迎,顾全林,沈懿.信誉的价值:以网上拍卖交易为例[J].经济研究,2006,41(12):81-91. 被引量:151
  • 3吴德胜.网上交易中的私人秩序——社区、声誉与第三方中介[J].经济学(季刊),2007,6(3):859-884. 被引量:81
  • 4Kandori, Michihiro. Social Norms and Community Enforcement. Review of Economic Studies, 1992, (59): 63-80.
  • 5Ellison, Glenn. Cooperation in the Prisoner' s Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching. Review of Economic Studies, 1994, 61(3): 567-588.
  • 6Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro, Andrew Postlewaite. Social Norms and Random Matching Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, (9): 79-109.
  • 7Greif, Avner. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition. American Economic Review, 1993, 83(3): 525-548.
  • 8Clay, Karen. Trade without Law: Private-order Institutions in Mexican California. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 1997, (13): 202-231.
  • 9Milgrom, P., D. North, B. Weingast. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champaign Fairs. Economics and Politics, 1990, (2): 1-23.
  • 10Bernstein, Lisa. Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry. Journal of Legal Studies, 1992, (21): 115-121.

共引文献207

同被引文献5

引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部