银行竞争性“催贷压贷”行为与联保贷款违约扩散

Competitive “Advance Debt-Collection and Deferred Lending” of Bank and Default Spread in Group Lending

联保贷款制度是解决中小企业融资难问题的重要金融创新,然而近几年发生的多起中小企业联保贷款信贷危机事件充分暴露了现行制度的风险。本文通过建立不完全信息博弈模型分析银行竞争性"催贷压贷"行为与联保贷款违约的相互作用,再进行案例分析研究联保贷款信贷危机的起因。研究结果发现:银行竞争性"催贷压贷"行为会增加企业的再融资风险,提高企业违约概率,推动信贷危机的扩散,是造成大面积违约的重要机制;为了有效防控联保贷款违约风险和信贷危机,银行应对企业同时参与多个联保团体进行限制,设立应急机制,并对提前采取"催贷压贷"行为的银行进行惩罚。

As an important innovation in financial market,group lending has become a popular solution to financing problems for SMEs.However,its risk has been exposed since several credit crises happened among SMEs with group lending.This paper conducted games of incomplete information and used case studies to analyze the connection between the competitive'advance debt-collection and deferred lending'and default in group lending.In this paper,we showed that:competitive'advance debt-collection and deferred lending'of bank would increase refinancing risk of the firm,increase probability of default,and is an important reason of default spread.In order to avoid credit crisis among SMEs with group lending,banks should be more careful in initial credit rating by forbidding limiting firms to join in many groups and punish those banks who did 'advance debt-collection and deferred lending'ahead of time.