摘要
一般认为,养老保险向基金积累制改革会损害代际间教育投入的积极性,但鲜有经验分析予以支持。本文建立世代交替模型,并借助2001年起逐步做实个人账户试点的自然政策试验,利用固定效应模型对我国1998—2009年地级市面板数据进行实证检验,结果表明,养老保险从现收现付向部分积累过渡,降低了政府投资教育的积极性,特别是,中央财政对做实个人账户的补助,进一步降低了当地公共教育支出的强度,证实了养老保险个人账户化的消极代际效应。
Most theoretical researches agree that pension privatization weakens the link between the old and the young,and so decreases the incentive to input on public education.But the empirical evidence has been lack.Taking the pension reform pilot in a few provinces in China as a natural experiment,we test the 1998—2009 prefecture-level panel data under a difference-in-difference framework.Empirical evidence shows that privatization reform is harmful to the local public expenditure on education;moreover,the subsidy from the central government weakens the intergenerational link further and impairs public education input,which verifies the negative intergenerational effects of pension privatization.
出处
《经济学报》
2016年第4期132-154,共23页
China Journal of Economics
基金
北京大学经济学院"中青年教师科研种子基金"的资助