社会保险缴纳收益与缴纳意愿?——限购令对社保缴纳意愿的影响分析

Fee-Benefit Linkage and Payroll Payment Behavior:Evidence from the Housing Restriction Policy

近年来许多城市出台的房产限购政策要求居民需要缴纳一段时期的社会保险才具备商贷及购房资格,这使得投资房产的收益成为社会保险缴纳的一种额外收益,进而可能提高居民参保的意愿,但是由于多缴纳的边际收益相对较低,居民可能会在参保的前提下尽可能少缴费。本文聚焦不同城市在不同时点出台的买房限购令,通过构建双重差分模型,估计社保缴费收益增加带来的居民缴费行为的变化。基于城镇住户调查数据和城市统计年鉴数据的研究发现,和社保挂钩的限购令对个人参保有显著正向促进作用,但对参保人群的平均缴费率有显著负向影响,限购令的影响随房价增长率的上升而加大。限购令的施行对私营企业职工、城镇个体经营者及被雇者的社保参保意愿的提升最大,缴费率的下降也最大。另外,限购令的影响随年龄而消减。我们的研究显示,提高社保收益有助于提高的人们参保意愿,同时为了鼓励大家多缴,需要提高相关激励或者规范征缴减少个人逃费行为。

The housing restriction policies in many cities often require individuals to participate the social pension program for a certain period to be eligible for getting mortgage or purchasing local houses.This policy increases the benefit of participating social insurance program and thus tightens the tax-benefit linkage of payroll fees.However,since the marginal benefit of paying more payroll fees is lower than the marginal cost,individuals have incentives to pay the minimum amount required to obtain the insurance coverage.Since the housing restriction policies was implemented in cities in different years,we apply the difference-in-difference framework to estimate the effects of increasing payroll fee-benefit linkage on individuals'insurance participation behavior.We find that the housing restriction policies significantly increased the participation rate of social insurance program.However,the policy also reduced the average payment rate among the participants.The effect was stronger in cities with higher housing price growth rate,among workers in private firms or self-employed individuals,and among young population.