车牌拍卖中的“伏击”报价现象分析

The Sniping Bidding in the Car Plates Auction

在广州和其他城市的车牌竞价拍卖中,竞价阶段会定时公布当前平均报价,使得车牌拍卖成了有限信息公开的密封报价拍卖。由于竞价参与者之间的利益是竞争的,理性竞价人都有动机误导其他参与人报告低价,竞价阶段公布的平均报价缺乏有价值的信息。有经验的参与人会在竞价最后阶段'伏击'报价,提交有效报价。实际拍卖的数据表明竞价阶段的当前平均报价大部分情形小于最低成交价。

In the car plates auction in Guang Zhou and other cities,the average bid is announced in the middle of bidding process,which makes the auction format a sealed bid auction with limited public information.The informed bidder will use the opportunity to mislead others with low bid price for the conflict of interest among bidders.It makes the announced average price uninformative.The experienced bidders only submit their winning bid at the end of auction by snipping bid.The summary statistics of auctions in four cities provide evidence of snipping biding:the announced average price is lower than the final successful strike price in most case.