城投债中的地方政府信用——隐性担保还是隐性担忧

Local Government Creditworthiness in Chengtou Bonds——Implicit Guarantee or Implicit Worry

现有文献对地方政府能否降低城投债的发行利差的问题存在着争议。本文采用我国债券市场2010-2015年间发行的1713只企业债和中期票据进行研究,结果发现地方政府信用在财政状况较好的地区表现为隐性担保降低了城投债的发行利差,而在财政状况较差的地区却表现为隐性担忧提高了城投债的发行利差。信用评级则没有充分考虑地方政府信用对城投债发行利差的差异化影响。本文为现有研究的争议提供了解释,并且为地方政府融资平台的转型提供了参考。

There exists a controversy about the role which local government plays over the spread of Chengtou bonds. Using a sample of 1713 bonds from 2010 to 2015 in Chinese bond market, this paper finds that the implicit government guarantee decreases the spread of Chengtou bonds whose issuers are from regions with more fiscal revenues. The implicit worry increases the spread of Chengtou bonds whose issuers are from regions with insufficient fiscal revenues. Furthermore, neither implicit guarantee nor implicit worry are fully incorporated into credit ratings of Chengtou bonds. These results explain the controversy of the role local government plays and have implications for transformation of local government financing platform.