不同电价机制下电力市场价格准入壁垒的研究

Price entry barriers in two electricity markets with different settlement rules

要吸引更多的市场成员参与到电力交易中,增加电力交易的竞争力度,必须尽量降低电力市场的准入壁垒。在库诺特(Cournot)寡头竞争模型的基础上,对电力市场在位成员的准入遏制行为的代价进行了分析。分析表明,在实行不同电价机制时,在位成员进行相同效果的准入遏制行为时所付出的代价不同:在实行"一机一价"电价机制时的代价较大,而在"市场统一电价"时的代价较小。基于"一机一价"电价机制的电力市场具有较低的市场准入壁垒,有利于新成员进入市场。在分析的基础上,提出了通过新的价格机制来解决此准入问题的思路。

Competition in electricity markets can be increased by lowering the entry barriers to attract more participants. This paper analyzes the costs of current participants preventing new participants from entering the market with a Cournot model based analysis. Comparison of the market costs of different price settlement mechanisms the PayAsBid (PAB) and the market clearing price (MCP) shows that the market participants must pay more with the PAB mechanism than with the MCP mechanism to prevent a new participant from entering the market. Therefore, the price entry barriers in the electricity market with the PAB mechanism are less than in a market with the MCP mechanism. The new pricing mechanism can lower the entry barriers in the electricity market.