带有供需双方促销努力的供需链合同问题研究

Supply chain contract model with supplier and retailer effort effects

为了研究分布决策对供需链性能的影响,对单销售商、单制造商、单一产品、一次采购、需求为随机变量且供应商制造商均可以通过促销努力扩大需求的报童模型进行了讨论,提出了一种形式化的合同策略,多种简单合同形式均可以纳入其中。证明了对于该问题,简单合同无法使供需链达到协调状态。但适当的合同参数下,使用这种形式化策略,通过供需双方博弈供需链能够达到稳定状态。数值分析表明,恰当地使用该合同策略,在稳定状态下供需链系统的性能优于使用普通合同的结果。

This paper studies a supply chain model in which a single supplier sells a single product to a single retailer facing the newsvendor problem. Both the supplier and the retailer can exert costly efforts to increase demand. A general framework is proposed to synthesize existing results of many supply chain contract forms. With this framework, the supply chain can not achieve channel coordination using any simple contract. But for some conditions, at least one equilibrium point exists for the effort game. A numeral analysis shows the contract increases the supply chain profit. 