创新企业剩余收益分配的博弈分析

On Innovative Enterprises' Surplus Revenue Allocation With Game Theory

使用博弈论的理论和方法 ,分析了创新企业中创新者与非创新者的剩余效益分配的方式与两者努力程度的关系 ,给出了完全信息情况下静态的Nash均衡解和动态的子博弈精炼Nash均衡解。并从企业收益的角度 ,证明了动态情况下的企业收益大于静态时的收益 ;并给出了在满足一定条件下 。

With the method of game theory, the paper analyzes the ways of allocating the surplus revenue between innovatir and non-innovator in the innovative enterprises in view of their efforts. It works out the static Nash equilibrium solution and dynamic sub-game refined Nash Equilibrium on condition of complete in formation. As far as enterprise revenue is concerned, it is assumed that the revenue under dynamic conditions exceeds that under static conditions; and besides, enterprise revenue by innovator acting first usually precedes that by non-innovator acting first.