从独立走向合作——中央银行未来发展趋势

From Independence to Cooperation: the Trend of Central Banks

本文从三个层面讨论了中央银行独立性问题。首先,立足于中央银行与政府的关系,分析中央银行保持独立地位的可能性;其次,立足于国内金融市场,探讨中央银行独立地位受到的挑战;最后,从开放经济层面分析中央银行独立性面临的外部冲击。本文认为,追求绝对的独立性不应成为中央银行的目标,相反,加强中央银行同有关各方的协调与合作是维持货币稳定与宏观经济内外均衡的前提。本文从国际货币合作与国内经济政策协调两方面分析了合作的必要性。此外,本文结合我国实际,分析了当前中国人民银行面临的合作课题。

In the paper, the authors present a number of different arguments with respect to central bank independence (CBI). It has been argued in some literatures that the degree of CBI can have a strong positive effect on monetary stability and the overall economy' s performance. The authors argue that CBI is neither sufficient nor necessary for monetary stability, and absolute CBI is a target which can not been reaching. First, it is impossible for government to give central bank absolute independence. Second, development and innovation in domestic financial market weaken central bank's stability to maintain monetary stability independently. Third, economy openness limits CBI to a large extent. Furthermore, the paper discusses the necessity of cooperation for central bank from two aspects including international currency coordination and domestic economic policy coordination. The conclusion is that the cooperation is the best choice for central bank, which aims at monetary stability, internal equilibrium and external equilibrium.