摘要
本文采用考虑信息代价的非完全信息结构,深入考察了封闭式报价机制中交易双方的均衡策略在信息代价变化时的演变过程,以及由此引起的一系列问题.
Taking incomplete information in the value of information into consi-deration,the equilibrious strateqies in sealed-bid mechanism and its evolution withthe change of the value of information as well as some related problems are stu-died.The main results in this paper are:(1)it is proved that equilibrious strate-gies have no relation with the value of information if it is rather small,whichexplains the partial rationality of the assumption of the zero-value of informationin many references;(2)some critical points of mutation of equilibrious strategiesare shown,the preference of players to strategies,expected profits as well assome negotiable regions are clarified;(3)the possibility to shift the value of in-formation from one player to the other is discussed,and also the conditions and therange of shift are given.
出处
《上海交通大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
1992年第5期45-52,共8页
Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
关键词
信息
封闭式报价
交易机制
information
sealed-bid mechanism
bargaining game
equilibrium strategy
incomplete
information
mutation