分而治之:防范合谋的不对称机制

Divide to Conquer:Asymmetric Mechanisms with Discrimination to Prevent Collusion

歧视现象广泛存在于各种类型的组织中，但经济学家一直未能就其合理性做出令人满意的解释。在本文中,我们采用一个简单的锦标赛模型指出了组织中歧视的作用在于有效地防范合谋。我们证明了带有显性歧视的不对称机制优于无歧视的对称机制。进一步地。通过引入委托人对信息的操纵，我们揭示了隐性的歧视机制的作用。并且证明了它优于显性的歧视机制。

Discrimination is quite common in organizations. In a simple tournament model,this paper reveals that the role of discrimination is an efficient mechanism in preventing collusion,which lies in the very spirit of'divide to conquer'. We show that asymmetric mechanisms withexplicit discrimination dominate symmetric mechanisms without discrimination. Furthermore, byintroducing the new means of the principal's manipulation of information, we highlight the func-tion of the implicit discrimination mechanism, and show that it dominates the explicit mechanism.