摘要
在成员间有利益冲突的情况下,授权是激励组织中成员释放其私人信息的一个重要方式。本文考察了在对多人授权时,权威分配的方式对于信息释放的影响。本文考虑了两种分配方案的影响。其一是所有的成员在形式上有同等的权威(委员会);其二是,某一个成员有全部的决策权威(科层制)。委员会的决策规则虽然在形式上是平等的,但在实质上却可能偏向于某个成员。科层制则在形式上就完全偏向于它的领导。本文表明,权威的集中分配放大了利益冲突的影响。并且,权威分配的形式上的偏向有支配性的作用:它压倒了利益冲突以及实质偏向的影响。
When there are conflict interests among the members, delegation is an importantway to reveal the members'private information in an organization. This paper studies how thedistribution of authority influences information transmission. It considers two possible distribu-tions. One is that all members formally have the same authority (committee); the other is thatone member owns the whole authority (hierarchy). The decision rule of the committee can besubstantially in favor of some party although it is designed to treat each member equally. In con-trast, hierarchy is inherently in favor of its leader. We find that the concentration of authority ag-gravates the effects of the conflict of interests in an organization.
出处
《经济学(季刊)》
2003年第1期217-236,共20页
China Economic Quarterly