摘要
跨国公司与东道国之间的博弈结果是双方受益,因而是一种“正和博弈”。东道国的FDI制度以及跨国公司FDI制度都是这种博弈的均衡结果,通过内生博弈规则和外生规则内部化而完成了作为整体的FDI制度的自我维系过程。由于信息的不对称和国家的多重悖论,加剧了博弈的复杂性,因而形成了动态的、连续的多阶段均衡,其外在表现就是FDI输入既有连续性、规律性,又有波动性、不确定性。
The rapid growth of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) has created games with the host countries. It is a positive-sum game because of double-win returns. The results of the game get the FDI institution of the host country and the FDI institution of TNCs into shape. With endogenous game rules and intemalization of exogenous rules, the unitary FDI system has completed its self-fulfilling process. The asymmetrical information and paradox of the state intensify the complexity of the game, as a result, engender dynamic, successive multi-phases equilibrium with the exterior representation of FDI input with succession, reqularity, fluctuation and uncertainty.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2003年第23期27-29,共3页
Commercial Research