摘要
如何判断行政机关作出的行政行为的合法性,不论是在国内法院的司法审查当中,还是在WTO争端解决机构的案件审理当中,都是一个必须回答的问题。在反倾销领域,由于美国的极力坚持,《反倾销协定》第17.6(ii)条,纳入了以美国Chevron规则为蓝本的司法审查标准。然而,第17.6(ii)条在DSB当中,并没有发挥Chevron规则在美国国内法院所发挥的功能。其原因在于,一方面,DSB并不受美国式的司法克制与三权分立理念的限制,而是会积极审查WTO成员国对于《反倾销协定》解释的合法性。另一方面,美国的国内法律体系是相对封闭的,因此DSB裁决在美国国内法院并没有既判力;然而,国际法是一个开放而模糊的体系,这就为DSB积极创造新的国际贸易规则提供了可能性。美国国内法院与DSB对于归零法问题的不同裁决结果,完整地体现了上述差异。对于我国来说,在针对美国的反倾销行为寻求法律救济时,要在避免被美国国内法律掣肘的同时,合理利用《反倾销协定》第17.6(ii)条,凭借WTO规则,合法地同美国进行对抗。
The determination of the legality of governmental administrative actions has been a question to answer not only for domestic courts but also for the Dispute Settlement Body of WTO.In the area of anti-dumping,owning to the insistence of the US,the drafting of the Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement was based on the Chevron Doctrine.However,the Article 17.6(ii) doesn’t function in the same way as the Chevron Doctrine does in American domestic courts.The reasons are as follows;on one hand,the function of DSB isn’t barred by the separation of power and judicial restraint.DSB will actively scrutinize the legality of interpretations of the Anti-dumping Agreement made by member states of WTO.On the other hand,the American legal system is relatively secluded,and DSB determinations are not considered as binding laws in the US legal system.Meanwhile,the international law is a system with open and obscure edges,which provides DSB with opportunities to actively create new international trade rules.The different outcomes of Zeroing lawsuits in American domestic courts and DSB decisions have fully demonstrated such differences.As to the practices of China,when seeking relief for US anti-dumping decisions,it’s wise to avoid the unfavorable US domestic laws,and take advantage of the Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in order to better battle against maneuvers of the US government.
出处
《武大国际法评论》
CSSCI
2010年第2期186-205,共20页
Wuhan University International Law Review
