最惠国待遇条款“失控”了吗?——论国际投资条约保护的“双边主义”与“多边化”

"Runaway" of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses? Bilateralism and Multilateralization of Treaty Protection for International Investment

在双边互惠主导的投资条约体制下,最惠国待遇条款可将投资条约的"双边承诺"转化为"多边承诺",从而协调不同条约的投资保护标准。但是,最惠国待遇条款不能将投资条约的任何承诺予以"多边化"。该条款适用于条约中的投资实体待遇,但不适用于条约的适用范围条款以及投资争端解决事项,除非该条约有明确的相反约定。将最惠国待遇条款适用于争端解决事项的仲裁实践,超出了投资条约的本意。为应对其扩张解释倾向,缔约国可在投资条约中明确予以限定。

Under the bilateral investment protection regime,most-favored-nation(MFN) clauses may serve to transform " bilateral commitments" into " multilateral commitments",and thus harmonize the protection standards offered by varying bilateral investment treaties.However,MFN clauses cannot " multilateralize" every commitment under bilateral investment treaties.A MFN clause in the basic investment treaty may apply to substantive investment treatments but not to the treaty’s scope of application provisions and dispute settlement matters,unless there is an unequivocal consent to the contrary in such treaty.The application of MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions in arbitral practices goes beyond the ordinary meanings of investment treaties.To avoid such expansive interpretation tendency,contracting states may set explicit limits on the application of MFN clauses in investment treaties.