论投资争议中国家安全问题的司法审查

The Judicial Review of National Security in Investment Disputes

外资并购国家安全审查与基于国家安全原因的外资管制措施均会对投资者权益带来影响,而能否对此实行司法审查则是当前国际投资法尚未解决的问题。欧盟对此提供了一种解决方案:司法审查当中充分尊重成员国对国家安全的定义,但对实现'国家安全'目标的手段合法性设定清晰的法律标准。与之相对比,在ICSID争端解决实践当中,何为国家安全、能否提交司法审查,以及手段合法性的法律标准均不清晰,针对同一投资措施的五起案件甚至相互矛盾。除此之外,外资并购国家安全审查目前仍游离于司法审查之外。此状况原因在于,欧盟法律能够服务于多元目标,且欧洲法院具有构建区域法制体系的动力,而ICSID项下临时仲裁庭并无上述意愿。中国当前的双边缔约实践当中,外资管理的'国家安全'抗辩条款已经相当科学;同时,为服务于'负面清单'模式的外资准入改革,即便无法对国家安全进行定义,也至少应当列出负面清单,另外,还应对国家安全审查手段的合法性标准进行清晰的制度设计。

Both the national security review of foreign M&A and "national security" exceptions negatively influence investors’ rights,yet judicial review in that regard is still largely absent.The EU solution,while in full respect of member states’ liberal definition of national security,adopts a very strict scrutiny against the means to this end.Comparatively,in ICSID cases,the definition of national security,availability of judicial review,and standard of legal means,vary.Five disputes arising from the same investment measure could even achieve different outcomes.While ECJ could focus on more goals than simply investment protection and has the motivation to contribute to better rule of law,ICSID had no such intention.Currently,China’s BITs adopt a very recommendable draft of national security exception.It’s advisable for future BITs to at least adopt the negativelist method and define the legality standard of the national security review when defining national security is impossible.