网络特许加盟商与品牌经销商的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Network and Brand Dealer

为了解决网络特许加盟商与品牌经销商之间的矛盾,本文采用静态和动态重复博弈相结合的方法,通过构建特许方—受许方、受许方—受许方的博弈模型框架,通过引入受许方被严格监管所付出的成本、特许方奖励、媒体对受许方违约的负面报道和公众担忧等作为变量,使受许方的履行合约程度控制在一个合理水平,进而使各地受许方在选择与特许方态度倾向于选择保守合作的策略。

In order to solve network and brand franchisees contradiction between dealers,we use both static and dynamic method of combining repeated game,by building permission side - permitted side,permitted side- permitted side model framework,and introducing the cost,reward and the default of the media coverage and public concerns about the negative effect as variables,so that the performance of the contract would be at a reasonable level,thereby enabling the attitudes tend to choose cooperation strategy.