期刊文献+

医生利他行为模型演绎与供方最优支付方式探索 被引量:4

Deducing the Model of Physician's Altruism Behavior and Exploring the Optimal Payment System on Supply-side
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摘要 医生利他行为是探求最优支付方式设计的先决条件。我国尚未有文献引用模型探索医生利他行为与支付方式、医疗费用和医疗质量的作用路径。本研究通过介绍其卫生经济学界定,引用模型演绎其异质性及作用于支付方式的路径,根据国际卫生经济领域该方面的研究趋势提出探索最优支付方式的建议。 Physician's altruism behavior is a crucial prerequisite for exploring the optimal payment system on supplyside. However, in China, there is no literature on its functional route for payment method, medical expense and quality. It illustrates its definitionin health economics area by introducing the model deducing the heterogeneity degrees and its role on the payment path, According tothe current research trend in the international health economics area, it provides proposals for exploring optimal payment method.
作者 李静静 王健
出处 《中国卫生经济》 北大核心 2015年第11期8-1,共3页 Chinese Health Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金(71373146) 山东大学自主创新基金自然科学专项"交叉学科培育项目"(2012JC038)
关键词 支付方式 医生 利他行为 physician altruistic behavior payment method
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参考文献18

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同被引文献45

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