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我国上市公司独立董事制度:缺陷与改进——一个基于制度分析的研究框架 被引量:87

Independent Director System of Listed Company in China: Limitation and Improvement
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摘要 本文认为,为改革董事会、完善公司治理而出现的独立董事制度须有相应的制度与之相配套,这些制度由包括外部公司治理制度、内部公司治理制度以及独立董事制度本身在内的公司治理制度,以证券法律制度为代表的非公司治理制度和以文化为主要内涵的非正式制度等所组成。我国目前的制度环境尚未能为独立董事制度提供强有力的支持,从而造成我国上市公司独立董事制度的先天缺陷,而对这些局限认识不足所导致的独立董事制度设计偏差则形成独立董事制度的后天不足。为完善目前我国上市公司独立董事制度,应该从制度分析入手,标本兼治,长期治本,短期治标,以治标为手段达到治本之目的。 This study shows that the independent director system should be incorporated with the necessary mechanisms. These mechanisms consist of (1) corporate governance mechanisms including external, internal corporate governance mechanisms and independent director mechanism itself; (2) mechanisms represented by security legal system; and (3) informal mechanisms whose major component is cultural contents. However, the fact that the institutional environment in China is unable to substantiate the independent director system leads to the inherited deficiency for the listed companies to employ the independent director system. Moreover, the lack of knowledge on these deficiencies further results in the deviation in the mechanism design of the independent director system, which acquires another deficiency of this system. Therefore, in order to improve the current status of independent director system in China, we should start from analyzing the institutional background, both on the surface, in a short-term context, and in the essence, in a long - term context. Furthermore, we need the cure on the surface as a measure to reach our goal: the real cure in essence.
出处 《会计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2003年第11期3-9,共7页 Accounting Research
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:70272021) 国家社会科学基金项目(批准号:02CJY006) 教育部人文社会科学研究"十五"规划项目(批准号:01JA790101)的阶段性成果
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