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区域经济非合作中地方政府行为的博弈分析

Game Theoretical Analysis of Local Government Behavior in Regional Economic Non-cooperation
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摘要 我国发达地区与不发达地区存在着要素市场、产品市场以及区域产业结构选择的非合作博弈。导致区域经济非合作的主要原因是政府官员的"经济人"和"理性人"本性,以及地方政府有干预经济的能力和缺乏区域管理的综合性权威机构。为了实现区域经济合作,应发挥中央政府的政策调控作用,规范地方政府的职能。 There are game theoretical non-cooperation among production elements market,production market and regional industrial structure choosing in both developed area and developing area of our country.The main causes are the economic and rational essentiality of government officers;local government’s having the ability of intervening economy,and lacking central authority in regional management.In order to achieve regional economic cooperation,we must exert the regulating and adjusting function of central government and normalize the function of local government.
出处 《武汉电力职业技术学院学报》 2007年第4期26-29,共4页 Journal of Wuhan Electric Power Technical College
关键词 区域经济合作 政府行为 博弈 regional economic cooperation government behavior game theory
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