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最优专利授权期模型的设计研究 被引量:2

The Research on Design the Model of OptimalPatent Authorization Period
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摘要 在技术创新过程中何时授予企业以专利权,既关系到专家政策的制定又涉及创新机制的设计。本文把企业间专利竞争设计为多阶段动态规划模型,在双寡头垄断阶段是Stackberg博弈过程,在完全垄断阶段企业继续进行技术创新,专利局以最大化社会剩余并给企业一定的收益来激励其创新活动,最后对模型中的重要参数进行探讨研究。 The issue of when to authorize the enterprises the patent right in the course of technological innovation, is related not only to the setting up of pa tent policy but also to the designing of innovation mechanism. The paper designs the patent competition among the enterprises to be a multi-stage dynamic progra mming model. In the stage of double oligopoly, it is a Stackberg game process; i n the stage of entire oligopoly, the technological innovation goes on, and the p atent office motivates the innovation activities by maximum social surplus and b ringing a certain benefits to enterprises. Finally, the authors study and discus s some important parameters in the model.
出处 《软科学》 北大核心 2003年第6期18-20,共3页 Soft Science
关键词 专利竞争 动态规划模型 Stackberg博弈 专利授权期 patent competition dynamic programming model Stackberg game patent a uthorization period
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参考文献7

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