论著作权中的默示许可——从“方正诉宝洁”案说起

本文以"方正诉宝洁倩体字案"二审法官的裁判思路的梳理切入口,对著作权中的默示许可的规范依据和法律地位进行相关界定,得出默示许可是一种特殊的许可使用权而非利益平衡的工具的结论。遵循这一思路,笔者在文章的第三部分梳理了国内外默示许可的立法和司法实践。并在第四部分对"方正诉宝洁案"中二审法院的裁判思路做了简要评析,认为当中存在默示许可和权利限制两者的混淆,既违背了默示许可的法律特征,也未尊重当事人的意思自治。最后,笔者对默示许可在互联网环境下解决著作权授权困难的作用提出了一些思考。

After clarifying judge ’s special referee ideas in “Founder v .P&G on the copyright of Qian characters”, this article analyses legal basis and systemat-ic position of Copyright Implied license , and concludes that implied license is still a kind of “license” or “authorization” rather than a tool of balancing interests . Based on this conclusion , in the third part , the article comments on the legislative <br> and judicial practice of implied license home and abroad , then evaluates the refer-ee ideas in“Founder v .P&G”, holding that in this case , the judge confuses “im-plied license” with“limitation of a right”, thus not only violates the true legal fea-ture of implied license but also fails to respect “party autonomy”.Finally, the au-thor reflects on how far implied license can solve the problems of copyright authori -zation in Internet circumstances .