企业并购中政府行为的目标选择与寻租模式分析

Analysis on Target - choosing and Rent - seeking Model of Governmental Behavior During the Enterprise Merger

企业并购中的政府行为过程也即政府各子目标的博弈过程。政府行为在企业并购中同时受“公共利益”假设和“经济人”假设双重调节,并购的寻租模式也由此产生,进而导致了并购参与者之间的利益调整。在单一产权结构下的企业并购,由于并购主体间仍然存在相对独立的利益边界.政府行为的目标选择和寻租模式均能合理存在。同时强调,中央政府与地方政府在企业并购中的行为目标有所区别。

The process of governmental behavior during the enterprise -merger is actually the game among its different targets. Governmental behavior would be modulated simultaneously by both of 'Public Interest' hypothesis and ' Economic Individual' hypothesis, which causes the occurrence of Rent -Seeking, further the adjustment of profit among merger participants. As for the merger between the sole-owned enterprises, choosing targets and Rent - Seeking model of governmental behavior still exists rationally because of the existence of profil margin from different merger participants. And we emphasize that there are some differences between the enterprise-merger targets of central government and local government.