重复博弈的两段式分析法

Two-part method of analyzing repeated games

提出了用于研究重复博弈的两段式分析法,该方法把无名氏定理的本质提取出来,即是否存在一个具有足以威胁参与人的后续博弈.两段式分析法既能适用于有限重复博弈也适用于无限重复博弈.利用两段式分析法,对不同的重复博弈无名氏定理进行了综合,从而可以看出不同的无名氏定理之间具有一致性,反过来也验证了论文提出的两段式分析法对重复博弈的实用性.

In this paper, a two_part method, which is used to analyze repeated games, is developed. The central idea of this method, which can be used to both finite and infinite repeated games, is whether there exists a continuation game having a threat large enough to force the players to adopt equilibrium strategies. It is also proved that various folk theorems can be synthesized via the two_part method, which shows the unity among different folk theorems and the exactness of two_part method.