摘要
上市公司治理理论丰富多彩,其中特别引人关注的是两种思想几乎完全相背的理论:代理理论与管家理论。代理理论将CEO(代理人)视为完全追求个人私利最大化的机会主义行为者,因而主张直接代表股东利益的董事会应该对CEO实施严格控制,而管家理论则将CEO(代理人)视作为实现股东利益而兢兢业业、勤勉尽责的管家,故主张董事会应该与CEO发展一种相互合作、完全信任的关系。本文借鉴代理理论与管家理论的思想,结合现实环境,对上市公司董事会与CEO关系的指导思想作出一种新的阐释,即当CEO在公司尚处于领导地位和权力的发展阶段,在工作中还没有获取重大成就之前的任职期间,董事会应该借鉴管家理论思想与CEO发展一种相互合作、彼此信任的工作关系,而当CEO在公司中的领导地位和权力得到较强发展,其潜能得到充分展示,在工作中取得重大成就以后的任职期间,董事会则应该借鉴代理理论思想对CEO可能出现的自负心态及机会主义行为实施严格控制。
Although the theories on corporate governance are rich and colorful, there are two theories, i.e. Stewardship theory and Agency theory whose meanings are almost opposite. Agency theory argued that it is very necessary to strictly control CEOs (Agents) by Board of Directors because of their opportunism, while Stewardship theory thought of CEOs (Agents) as Stewardships who must be cautiously and conscientiously work in order to achieve stockholders′benefits, and therefore contested that Board of Directors should develop a cooperative and credible relationship with CEOs. Referring to the thought of Stewardship theory and Agency theory, the article tries to demonstrate the relationship between Board of Directors and CEOs with dynamic angle. When CEOs are still developing their leadership and power, and have not yet achieved any great success, it is very necessary to develop a cooperative and credible relationship between Board of Directors and CEOs by referring to Stewardship theory; but once CEOs have acquired great achievement and built their leadership and power, Board of Directors should strictly control CEOs′ overconfidence and opportunism action.
出处
《管理评论》
2003年第10期34-39,共6页
Management Review