摘要
通过考察上市公司高级管理层激励测度的内在结构,利用因子分析法获得了"经理薪酬"和"经理持股"两个主成分,在此基础上,建立经济增加值、市场增加值与两个主成分的多元回归模型并统计检验。结果表明:东部和西部上市公司高级管理层激励测度的内在结构存在明显差异,东部股权激励较货币激励突出,西部货币激励较股权激励突出。东部上市公司经济增加值与"经理薪酬"、"经理持股"显著正相关,市场增加值与两个激励测度正相关,但不显著;西部地区经济增加值与"经理薪酬"显著负相关,市场增加值与"经理薪酬"和"经理持股"均存在显著的正相关关系。
On the basis of observing the inherent structure of top-management incentive in listed companies and by factor analysis, we get two principal components, which are executive salary and executive shareholding. Then, we establish several multivariate regression models which link economic value added(EVA) and market value added(MVA) to the two principal components and carry out statistical tests. The results show that the inherent structure of top-management incentive of listed companies in Chinese eastern and western areas is obviously different. In the east, equity incentive is more outstanding than monetary incentive, EVA is significantly positively related with executive salary and executive shareholding; MVA is positively related with the two principal components, but not significant. In the west, monetary incentive is more outstanding than equity incentive; EVA is significantly negatively related with executive salary while MVA is significantly positively related with executive salary and executive shareholding.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
2003年第6期46-50,69,共6页
Forecasting
基金
国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(79725002)
关键词
委托—代理
激励
绩效
经济利润
principal-agent
incentive
performance
economic profit