摘要
废旧电器回收处理实施市场准入制度的实质形成了政府管理部门与再生企业之间的委托代理经济运行关系。基于有限理性假设,分析废旧电器回收再生利用产业运行中的政府管理部门与再生企业收益关系,建立了委托代理模型,构造拉格朗日函数,进行博弈分析求解;从再生企业经营低效与高效的概率比率视角,揭示政府管理部门调整监管政策与激励因素的基本原理,分析了再生企业经营效率与经营成本的关联关系,调动再生企业废旧电器生态化处理的积极性是废旧电器回收再生利用产业健康发展与多方共赢的有效途径。
The essence of market access system in waste electrical recycling appliance forms the principal-agent relationship between the government management departments and regenerative enterprises. Based on the limited rational hypothesis, the paper analyzes the economic benefit relationship between the government management departments and regenerative enterprises during the industrial operation of waste electrical appliance recycling, establishes a principal-agent model and Lagrangian function and thus solves the game analysis model. From the perspective of ratio between regenerative enterprises operation in high efficiency or low efficiency, the paper reveals the basic principle of government management departments adjusting the regulatory policies and incentive factors, and analyzes the relationship between the regenerative enterprises operation efficiency and operation cost. Arousing the enthusiasm of regenerative enterprises ecological treatment with waste electrical appliance is an effective way to realize the healthy development and win-win situation of recycling use of the waste electrical appliance industries.
出处
《西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2015年第5期58-63,共6页
Journal of Xidian University:Social Science Edition
基金
国家自然基金项目(71573188):废旧电器再生利用生态产业链完整社会契约集成优化机理研究
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(11YJA630203):废旧电器回收再生利用产业链主体责任分配机理及其协同机制研究
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJA630046):废旧电器回收再生利用产业链主体激励模型及政策研究-基于价格协同视角
关键词
废旧电器
再生利用
市场准入
委托代理
博弈分析
waste electrical appliances
recycling use
market access
principal-agent
game analysis