摘要
基于不完全信息条件下的贝叶斯博弈模型,建立了水污染物排放权交易市场中交易企业关于排放权交易价格谈判的博弈模型。分别从买卖方交易企业效用最大化的角度确定了双方的最优报价策略。研究表明:排污权交易双方的真实报价有利于促成排污权的成功交易,且有助于交易双方实现帕累托效率优化。
Based on Bias game model under the condition of incomplete information,this paper established the emissions trading price negotiation game model between the transition enterprises under water pollutant emissions trading market and determined the bidding strategy respectively from the perspective of the maximum benefit of the buyer and the seller. The research showed that the real bids of the two parties contribute to the successful trading of emission right and help the parties achieve Pareto efficiency optimization.
出处
《水资源与水工程学报》
2015年第5期83-86 92,共5页
Journal of Water Resources and Water Engineering
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(12&ZD214)
关键词
水污染
排污权
排污权交易模型
贝叶斯博弈
water pollution
emission right
emission righ trading price model
Bias game