财政分权体制下中国地方政府罚没收入诱因研究

An Analysis of Chinese Local Government's Penalty and Forfeiture under the Constitution of Fiscal Decentralization

中国地方政府罚没收入连年快速增长不仅仅是出于各执法部门利己的动机,更重要的是中国财政分配体制使然。财政分权使得地方政府财权与事权严重不匹配,尤其是县乡财政日益困难,这是中国地方政府罚没收入增长的客观原因。地区间竞争使得中国地方政府"重投资、轻服务",对执法部门实行差额预算,剥离大量具有行政执法功能机构转而成立事业单位,且允许执法部门雇佣"临时工"以降低财政支出,这是中国地方政府罚没收入增长的主观原因。另外,中国罚没收入管理制度为这种增长提供了支持。在主、客观原因及罚没收入管理制度的双重激励与约束体制下,地方政府罚没收入不得不连年快速增长。

The local government's income from penalty and forfeiture rises quickly.It is not just owing to self-interest of the law enforcement department,but is due to the distribution institute of the revenue of China.The revenue distribution reform makes the local government fall into the revenue crisis,so the local governments have to create revenue through law enforcement which is one of the measures local government can make money.On one hand,the local government implements budget management by remainder to the law enforcement departments and sets up lots of government-sponsored institutions.The local government also permits the law enforcement departments hire casual laborers.On the other hand,the local governments encourage the law enforcement department to create income through income sharing schedule and the local government also implements budget control on the penalty and confiscatory income of law enforcement department.