摘要
本文从管理者权利理论出发,以沪市A股制造业企业2006—2010年的数据为样本,对超额薪酬和企业绩效在不同性质企业中的关系进行了分析,并探讨了高管薪酬限制对其的影响。结果显示:超额薪酬对企业绩效有显著的负面影响,区分所有权性质后发现,超额薪酬的负面作用仅在非国有控股企业中存在,在国有控股企业中超额薪酬能起到积极的激励作用,有利于企业绩效的提升。在引入高管薪酬限制政策后发现,"限薪令"颁布后,国有企业的超额薪酬水平显著下降且其对企业绩效的积极作用得到进一步强化;非国有企业的超额薪酬与企业绩效之间负向关系转变为正相关,缓解了超额薪酬所带来的代理问题。上述结论表明,在国有企业薪酬激励机制改革中,要正确对待和认识企业的超额薪酬制度,防止"一刀切",但在非国有企业中要重视超额薪酬所带来的代理问题。此外,"限薪令"作为一种政府干预企业薪酬改革的方式,弥补了公司治理机制的缺陷,在薪酬激励机制方面起到积极的作用。
Based on the managerial power hypothesis,this article utilized the data which were extracted from manufacturing enterprises listed in SSE A market from 2006 to 2010to explore the relationship between over payment and business performance in different types of enterprises and compensation restrictions.The result shows:over payment has a significant negative impact on business performance,but this negative impact exists just in non-state enterprises.Making a distinction between state-owned enterprises and non-state enterprises,the over payment has a significant positive impact on business performance in state-owned enterprises,which is conducive to enhance business performance.After introducing compensation restrictions,this study found that the over payment of state-owned enterprises decreased significantly and the positive relationship was strengthened with business performance.Meanwhile,the over payment of non-state enterprises was reduced and the negative relationship be reversed for positive correlation with business performance.The conclusions show that correctly realizing and handling system of over payment and avoiding the situation of 'one size fits all'are important for the salary incentive mechanism reform of stateowned enterprises,but in the non-state-owned enterprises,attention should be paid to the agency problems arising form over payment.In addition,the'salary limit order',served as a form of government intervention,marks up for the shortcomings of company management mechanism and plays an active role in the pay incentives.
出处
《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第9期75-87,共13页
Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
安徽省高校人文社会科学研究重大项目(SK2014ZD006)
安徽大学研究生学术创新研究项目(YFC100311)
关键词
管理者权利理论
薪酬限制
超额薪酬
企业绩效
managerial power hypothesis
compensation restrictions
exceeded compensation
corporate performance