两类代理成本之于金字塔结构下公司效率的中介作用研究

The Mediating Role of Agency Costs to the Corporation Efficiency under Pyramid Structure

根据代理理论,可以将公司治理过程中的代理成本划分为管理层与股东之间的第一类代理成本和大股东与中小股东之间的第二类代理成本。以上述理论为背景,本文研究了两类代理成本在金字塔结构类型影响公司效率的过程中所起到的中介作用。通过对2010-2014年创业板上市公司的数据实证研究发现,金字塔结构的纵向层级、横向跨度均显著降低了两类代理成本,提高了上市公司效率,两类代理成本在金字塔结构的纵向层级和横向跨度影响公司效率的过程中,发挥显著的部分中介作用,且第一类代理成本的中介作用大于第二类代理成本,这与以往关于成熟上市公司金字塔结构的研究结论不同,为确保结果的可靠性,本文进行了稳健性检验。结合创业板实际,从终极控制人利用金字塔结构对公司治理实施支撑行为的角度给出了合理的解释,试图丰富关于金字塔结构下公司代理成本的研究。

According to the agency theory,we can divide the agency costs in the process of corporate governance into the first type of agency costs between the management and the shareholder and the second type of agency costs between the large shareholder and the small shareholder.Against this background,this paper analyzed the mediating role of two types of agency costs in the process of the pyramid structure affecting the corporation efficiency.Through the empirical study on the data of GEM companies from 2010 to 2014,the results show that both the longitudinal level and horizontal span of pyramid structure reduce the mediating role of two types of agency costs significantly and improve the efficiency of listed companies.Two types of agency costs play a significant part of the intermediary role in the process of the longitudinal level and the horizontal span of pyramid structure affecting the corporation efficiency,and the mediating role of the first type of agency cost is greater than the second type of agency cost.This is different from the previous studies on the structure of mature listed pyramid companies.Combined with the actual GEM,the paper gave a reasonable explanation from the perspective of the ultimate controlling people using the pyramid structure to implement support behavior to the companies,which tried to enrich the study of agency costs in pyramid structure.