股权激励与高管离职——基于上市公司的经验数据

Equity Compensation and Executive Turnover——Empirical Data from Listed Company

股权激励是企业留住人才的"金手铐"。本文以《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》实施后的2006年1月1日至2012年12月31日期间实施股权激励的A股上市公司为研究样本,并以样本公司实施股权激励前后3年的数据为依据,采用TOBIT模型进行多元线性回归,研究了股权激励的实施及其方式的选择是否影响高管离职。研究结论表明:实施股权激励能非常有效地降低高管离职率,并且,相对于非业绩受迫的高管离职,其对业绩受迫的高管离职更具抑制作用;另外,限制性股票比股票期权更能降低高管离职率。本文的研究为股权激励与高管离职关系的研究提供了新的经验证据。

Equity incentive is called'golden handcuff'for the enterprise to retain talents.In this paper,we selected the companies that had implemented equity compensations during the period from January 1st,2006 to December 31 th,2012as research samples.And on the basis of the data before and after the implementation of equity compensations for 3years,we studied,through multiple linear regression of TOBIT model,whether the implementation of equity compensation and the different ways chosen would affect executive turnover.The results indicate that:the implementation of equity incentive executives can reduce executive turnover rate very effectively.And compared with the turnover not for the reason of performance,it had more significant inhibitory effect on turnover for the reason of performance.In addition,restricted stock can reduce the executive turnover rate more effectively than stock options.In this paper,the research provides new empirical evidence for the study of relationship between equity compensation and executive turnover rate.