高管薪酬激励与组织绩效:基于管理者过度自信的“遮掩效应”

Relationship Between Salary Incentive and Organizational Performance:Based on the Suppressing Effects of Managers' Overconfidence

以往关于薪酬激励的研究忽略了激励制度对个体心理因素的影响,本研究基于传统代理理论,从薪酬认知观出发,将管理者过度自信引入薪酬激励与组织绩效的关系研究中,利用2010-2014年上证A股上市公司的样本数据进行实证研究。结果表明:高管薪酬水平与组织绩效不相关,但高管薪酬差距与组织绩效显著正相关;高管薪酬水平和薪酬差距与管理者过度自信之间均显著正相关;而管理者过度自信与组织绩效显著负相关;管理者过度自信在高管薪酬水平与组织绩效之间的间接效应不显著,而在高管薪酬差距与组织绩效之间存在显著的间接效应,且具体表现为"遮掩效应"。本文从管理者的心理因素出发,深化了薪酬与绩效的相关研究,为后续研究提供了一个全新的视角,为企业制定合理的薪酬制度提供了理论证据。

Prior research on salary incentive neglected the influence of individual psychological factors.This study introduces managers' overconfidence into the relationship between salary incentive and organizational performance based on the traditional agent theory from the cognitive perspective.Hypotheses are tested using date of Shanghai A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2014.The empirical results show that:a.managers' pay level is not related to organizational performance;b.managers' pay gap have a significant positive effect on organizational performance;c.both managers' pay level and pay gap can promote managers' overconfidence;d.managers' overconfidence have a significant negative effect on organizational performance;e.managers' overconfidence have a suppressing effect between managers' pay gap and organizational performance while there is no significantly indirect effect between managers' pay level and organizational performance.