国企价值增值、高管努力选择与最优长期激励研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

The Value Increment of State-owned Enterprises,the Effort Choice of Executives and the Optimal Long Term Incentive

将国企高管的经营管理行为分为两类,一类偏重于提升企业的短期业绩,另一类偏重于提升企业的长期价值。从理论和实证角度论证,合理的薪酬制度应该建立与高管的两类行为相匹配的激励机制,即引入以股权激励为主的长期激励,并在长、短期激励之间建立一个适宜比例。通过对2010-2014年间实施股权激励的528家上市国企和民企的实证分析表明:在短期激励方面,国企高于民企;在长期激励方面,国企低于民企。建议在国企高管薪酬制度改革中,不仅要降低、限制短期激励,还要相应地提升长期激励,同时通过完善股权激励实施的治理环境、业绩考核标准等推进国企高管的薪酬制度改革。

In this paper,we studied the problem of executive compensation structure for realizing the value increment of state-owned enterprises.This paper differentiated between two types of state-owned enterprise executives' management behavior.One put emphasis on improving the short-term performance of enterprises,and the other on enhancing the long-term value of enterprises.From the theoretical and empirical perspectives,this paper confirmed that reasonable compensation system should establish the incentive mechanism which matches two kinds of behavior of executives.And there is a proper proportion between the long term incentive and short term incentive.Through the empirical analysis of the implementing equity incentive of 528 listed state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in the 2010~2014,we found that state-owned enterprises are higher in the short-term incentive than private enterprises;and state-owned enterprises are lower in the long-term incentive than private enterprises.The paper suggested that we should not only reduce and limit the short-term incentive,but also increase in long-term incentive in the state executive pay system reform.It should improve the governance environment of the implementation of equity incentive,performance assessment standards,and promoting the salary system reform of SOE executives.